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The next Generation Mobile Networks 5G is expected to start rolling out by
2020, targeting at significantly faster mobile data speeds and increasingly
massive machine communications. As we are entering into a whole new
wireless time, where the blend of spectrum policy and technology becomes
more important, the networking practices are tightly coupled with economic
considerations. Therefore, a novel economic-driven spectrum policy should
be designed to support all spectrum access methods with flexibility to take
advantage of potentially new spectrum sharing paradigms.
In this thesis, we present the feasibility of putting economic models in
the existing dynamic spectrum sharing architectures, from three aspects:
spectrum sublicensing at a small scale, spectrum auction design, and li-
censed and unlicensed band selection. We point out the challenges under
each scenario and propose solutions to address these problems.
First, for the spectrum sublicensing, we introduce the concept of the
protection zone to enable multiple operators to spatially share the spec-
trum and ensure exclusive usage without any interference. Furthermore,
the trade-off between the precision of boundary estimation and the cost of
sensing networks is analysed. Second, for the spectrum auction, we study
how an interference graph influences performance of the auction algorithm
and guarantees fairness and truthfulness. Additionally, we further propose
a negotiable auction for a more efficient spectrum allocation based on a
mixed graph which offers a base station a second chance if the original re-
quest is rejected. Unlike the existing work, our proposed solution with a

faster grouping scheme performs better in a dense situation, hence it ac-
commodates more base stations. Third, for the licensed and unlicensed
band selection from the perspective of operators, we build a finite game
and present performance comparisons of different strategies. Moreover, the
analysis of the Nash equilibrium is provided and so are the suggestions on
how to achieve high benefits for different scales of operators.
We apply our design and findings to the potential spectrum sharing
architectures, i.e., Licensed Shared Access and Spectrum Sharing System.
We strengthen the coupling of the sublicensing scheme with the spectrum
sharing platforms by enabling each base station as an individual bidder and
let them bid for a contour based sublicense, ensuring the exclusive right
and interference protection. Additionally, we also analyse the unlicensed
and licensed band selection from the perspective of operators and prove the
equilibrium existence in the spectrum market. In conclusion, the short-term
sublicensing in the secondary market has not been fully studied and put
into practice yet. The thesis has given rise to an integration of spectrum
technology and policy. It is believed that, in the future, the economic-
aware spectrum policy design could be incorporated into communication
technology to realize an innovative, efficient and flexible sharing model.
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